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E-mail: {fren,minjie,john}@uow.edu.au
Abstract. Electronic Commerce has been a very significant commercial phenomenon in recent years, and autonomous agents are
widely adopted by business or individuals in electronic marketplaces to fulfill time consuming tasks in trading. Agent negotiation
mechanisms are usually applied between conflicted agents in order to reach a mutually beneficial agreement. Prediction of
trading agents’ strategies and behaviours in negotiation is a very significant research topic in agent negotiation. By employing
the prediction results on opponents’ possible strategies and behaviours during a negotiation, trading agents can plan and perform
corresponding strategies in order to maximize their own profits. Significant achievements have been made on this topic. However,
most existing approaches are based on machine learning mechanisms, which may fail to capture opponents’ behaviours in open
and dynamic electronic marketplaces. In this paper, two agent behaviour expectation approaches are introduced to help trading
agents to capture opponents’ potential behaviours during a negotiation in complex e-marketplaces. (i) The regression analysis
approach focuses on illustrating the main trends of opponents’ trading behaviours; (ii) the vector analysis approach pays more
attention to identifying opponents’ detailed negotiation strategies. The experimental results show the efficiency and efficacy of
the two proposed approaches in open and dynamic negotiation environments.
Keywords: Agent negotiation, e-marketplace, agent behaviour prediction
1. Introduction
Electronic Commerce (e-commerce) has been chan-
ging traditional methods of business in recent years and
has become a very important commercial phenomenon
[11,14]. Nowadays, many businesses operate in elec-
tronic marketplaces (e-markets). By comparison with
traditional marketplaces, e-markets have some obvious
advantages. (1) The e-market provides wider trading
environments to participators than the traditional mar-
ketplace. (2) The e-market saves participators’ costs on
physical resources compared with traditional market-
places. And (3) the e-market provides efficient instru-
ments for communicating and trading between partici-
pators. For example, in e-marketplaces, merchants can
save their budgets on business maintenance by avoid-
ing physical shops and shop assistants. Also, shoppers
do not need to visit shops in person which can save
*Corresponding author.
costs on traffic and time. Moreover, all participators
can collect information about their items of interest
and communicate with potential trading partners in a
timely manner. Participators in an e-market are usu-
ally busy in collecting information, selecting trading
partners, comparing similar goods and bargaining with
different trading partners. In order to release partici-
pators from these time consuming jobs, autonomous
agents are employed on behalf of traders to fulfil trad-
ing activities in e-markets. Participators only need
‘tell’ agents about their trading expectations, and then
agents can perform the detailed dealing procedures au-
tomatically. However, because agents may have differ-
ent trading purposes and strategies, conflicts may hap-
pen when they perform detailed trading behaviours in
an e-market. Negotiation mechanisms are usually ap-
plied between conflicted agents in order to reach a mu-
tually beneficial agreement among them [21,27,29]. In
Fig. 1, we display an example of agent negotiation. Six
agents (three buyers and three sellers) bargain over is-
1570-1263/12/$27.50 c© 2012 – IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved
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Fig. 1. A 3-to-3 multilateral negotiation.
sues related to purchasing a car. The buyers have diffe-
rent preferences on car models, colors and accessories,
and the sellers concentrate more on profiles they can
get. In order to reach an agreement by considering in-
dividual expectations, agent negotiation is adopted in
such a situation. The detailed concepts about agent ne-
gotiation are introduced in the following paragraph.
Negotiation is a means for agents to communicate
and compromise to reach mutually beneficial agree-
ments [7,16]. However, in most situations, agents do
not have complete information about their partners’
negotiation strategies, and may have difficulty in mak-
ing decisions on future negotiations, such as how to se-
lect suitable partners for further negotiation [1,18], or
how to generate a suitable counter-offer in the next ne-
gotiation round [20]. Therefore estimation approaches
which can predict uncertain situations and possible
changes in the future are required to help agents gener-
ate good and efficient negotiation strategies. Research
on partner behaviour estimation has been a very active
direction in recent years. By employing the expecta-
tion results on opponents’ possible strategies and be-
haviours, self-interested agents can plan and perform
corresponding behaviours during a negotiation in or-
der to maximize their own profits. The literature in-
cludes significant achievements on this topic [3–5,12,
13,19,23,30,31]. However, most existing approaches
are based on machine learning mechanisms, i.e. the be-
haviour estimation approaches are well trained by sam-
ples in advance. Such mechanisms may perform well
when the negotiation environment and opponents’ be-
haviours are simple, i.e. the negotiation environment
does not change during the negotiation and opponents
do not modify their negotiation strategies frequently.
However, in a real e-market, participators can enter
into or leave off a marketplace freely. Hence, a nego-
tiation environment may become highly dynamic, and
opponents may modify their negotiation strategies fre-
quently in order to maximize their profits. Therefore,
when the machine learning based approach is used in
real-world applications, some limitations will emerge.
In general, a machine learning based approach com-
prises two steps in order to properly estimate the
agents’ behaviour. In the first step, the proposed esti-
mation function is required to be well trained by train-
ing data. Therefore, the performance of the estima-
tion function is somehow decided by the training re-
sult. The training data could be both synthetic or col-
lected from the real world. Usually, the synthetic data
are helpful in training a function to enhance its prob-
lem solving skill for some particular issues, while the
real world data can help the function to improve its
ability in complex problem solving. After the estima-
tion function is trained, it is employed to predict oppo-
nents’ behaviours in the second step. However, no mat-
ter how many data are employed to train the estimation
function, the training data may still not be comprehen-
sive enough to cover all situations in reality. Therefore,
it is very likely that the behaviour estimation results
cannot truly reflect an opponent’s behaviour which is
not included in the training data. Also, when the nego-
tiation environment becomes more open and dynamic,
agents with different purposes, preferences and nego-
tiation strategies can enter into and leave a negotiation
dynamically. The machine learning based behaviours
estimation approaches may not work well in such an
uncertain situation by considering the limitations of
(1) lacking sufficient data to train the estimation func-
tion, and (2) requesting extra trading time.
In this paper, two approaches for agent behaviour
estimation are introduced to solve agent behaviour es-
timation problems in open and dynamic environments
from different perspectives. The first approach is based
on a regression analysis mechanism. By dynamically
analyzing historical offers from an opponent, a power
regression function is generated to fit the opponent’s
behaviour in each negotiation round dynamically and
optimally. Then by analyzing the regression function,
the opponent’s behaviours can be identified. The esti-
mation on the opponent’s possible behaviour in the fol-
lowing negotiation round is indicated by a confidence
bound. By comparing the difference between the op-
ponent’s behaviour in the historical record and the es-
timation results, the accuracy level of the regression
function can also be calculated. Based on an agent’s
requirements on the accuracy of estimation results, the
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form of the regression function can also be changed
dynamically during the negotiation. Such a regression
estimation approach is very suitable for handling the
opponent behaviour prediction problem in uncertain
environments, and to identify the main trends of an op-
ponent’s trading behaviour.
The second approach pays more attention to de-
tailed trends of an opponent’s behaviour. According to
the extent of the opponent’s concessions during a ne-
gotiation, the opponent’s possible behaviours are pre-
classified into several classes. During a negotiation,
because an opponent may apply different strategies to
make concessions in different periods of the negotia-
tion, a vector analysis method is introduced to identify
the opponent’s concession strategies in each negotia-
tion period. Then, based on the opponent’s historical
concession strategies, the possible concession strategy
in the following negotiation round can be estimated.
Compared with the regression approach, this vector
approach will give more detailed information about an
opponent’s behaviour in different negotiation periods.
Agents can get more information about an opponent’s
preferred negotiation strategies and behaviours in dif-
ferent negotiation periods and situations.
By comparison with machine learning mechanisms,
the proposed two approaches only use the historical of-
fers in the current negotiation to estimate an opponent’s
behaviour in future negotiations and do not require any
additional training process. So the proposed approa-
ches are very suitable to work under an open and dyna-
mic negotiation environment, and to make timely cred-
ible judgements on an opponent’s behaviour. Also, be-
cause the proposed approaches do not make any strict
assumption on an agent’s purpose, preference and ne-
gotiation strategy, they can be employed widely in ne-
gotiation by different types of agents. Furthermore, the
proposed regression approaches not only represent the
estimation results within bound, but also give the prob-
ability that each individual situation may happen in fu-
ture. Thus an agent can easily have an overview on an
opponent’s possible behaviours, and then modify its
own negotiation strategy based on this information.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we introduce the power regression approach to
estimate an opponent’s negotiation behaviour. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce the vector analysis approach to
show how to predict an opponent’s behaviour. Sec-
tion 4 introduces an approach to calculate the proba-
bility that predicted behaviours may happen in the fu-
ture. Section 5 discusses the experimental results of the
two proposed estimation approaches, and also a com-
parison between related approaches. In Section 6, re-
lated work on agent behaviour estimation is introduced
and compared with the proposed approaches. Section 7
concludes this paper and suggests future work.
2. Regression analysis
In this section, we introduce a power regression ap-
proach to analyse an opponent’s historical offers and to
predict the opponent’s possible negotiation behaviours
in the future.
2.1. Background
In this subsection, we introduce the background
about the proposed power regression function for op-
ponent behaviour estimation in negotiation. The re-
gression analysis employ both mathematics and prob-
ability theory, and can estimate the strength of a mod-
eled relationship between one or more dependent and
independent variables. In order to simplify the com-
plexity for the proposed regression analysis approach,
we make the following simple assumption about a ne-
gotiation:
The utilities that an agent gains from an opponent in
previous negotiation rounds is a sequence in mono-
tonic ascending order.
The reason behind this assumption is based on the
consideration that a negotiator cannot break its previ-
ous promises during a negotiation. Generally, there are
four kinds of behaviour which an agent can perform
in a negotiation, namely Boulware, Linear, Conceder
and Sit-and-Wait [6,8,28].
In Fig. 2, we illustrate these four common agent be-
haviours. Let the x-axis indicate the negotiation round
and the y-axis represents the concession that an agent
can make in a negotiation. Details of the four common
negotiation strategies are as follows:
– Boulware: the rate of change in the slope is in-
creasing, corresponding to smaller concessions in
the early stage of a negotiation, but large conces-
sions in the later stage of the negotiation.
– Linear: the rate of change in the slope is zero, cor-
responding to a constant concession throughout a
negotiation.
– Conceder: the rate of change in the slope is de-
creasing, corresponding to large concessions in
the early stage of a negotiation, but smaller con-
cessions in the later stage of the negotiation.
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Fig. 2. Four common strategies in agent negotiation.
– Sit-and-Wait: the rate of change of the slope and
the slope itself are always zero, corresponding to
not making any concession throughout a negotia-
tion.
Since the curves of an agent’s possible behaviours
illustrated in Fig. 2 are monotonic, we introduce a
power regression function to predict an agent’s be-
haviour in single-issue bilateral negotiation as follows:
U(t) = a× tb (1)
where U(t) is the utility gained from an opponent at
round t (0  t  τ , τ is the agent negotiation dead-
line), and both a and b (a  0, b  0) are independent
of t. It is noticed that the four negotiation strategies can
be represented by Eq. (1) with different b values:
– Boulware: when b > 1, the rate of change in the
slope is decreasing, corresponding to smaller con-
cessions in the early stage but large concession in
later cycles.
– Linear: when b = 1, the rate of change in the
slope is zero, corresponding to a constant conces-
sion throughout a negotiation.
– Conceder: when 0 < b < 1, the rate of change
in the slope is increasing, corresponding to large
concessions in the early stage but smaller conces-
sion in the later stage.
– Sit-and-Wait: when b = 0, the rate of change
of the slope and the slope itself are always zero,
corresponding to not making any concession
throughout a negotiation.
In the following subsection, we will introduce the
proposed power regression function to analyze and es-
timate possible opponent behaviours.
2.2. Regression analysis on partners’ behaviours
In this subsection, we introduce a power regression
analysis approach on a negotiation between two nego-
tiators. Firstly, we perform the following equivalence
transformation on Eq. (1):
ln(U(t)) = ln(a× tb)
= ln(a) + b× ln(t) (2)
Then let U(t)∗ = ln(U(t)), a∗ = ln(a) and t∗ =
ln(t), Eq. (2) can be rewritten as:
U(t)∗ = a∗ + b× t∗ (3)
The new function indicates a linear relationship be-
tween the variables t∗ and U(t)∗. Both coefficients a∗
and b are independent of t∗. Let ût be the real utility
that an agent gained from an opponent at round t. The
difference between the agent’s real gained utility (ût)
and the expected utility U(t)∗ can be expressed by the
formula ε(t) = ût − a∗ + b× t∗. It is assumed that the
distribution of ε(t) obeys the Gaussian distribution, i.e.
ε ∼ N(0, σ2).
Let pairs {(ti, ûi)} (i ∈ [0, n]) be the historical
records of an agent’s utilities in the previous n rounds
in the current negotiation, where ti (ti < ti+1) indi-
cates the ith negotiation round, and ûi (ûi  ûi+1)
indicates the real utility that the agent gained from the
opponent. Firstly, we transform all pairs of (ti, ûi) to
(t∗i , û
∗




Because û∗i = U(t)
∗ + εi, where εi is the estima-
tion error in round i and the distribution of all εi obeys
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(5)
Because the purpose of this regression approach
is to find a function U(t)∗ to fit all real utilities
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optimally, so the joint probability density function
for U(t)∗ should be maximized. In order to make L





should achieve its minimum value. Let Q(a∗, b) =∑n
i=1(û
∗
i −a∗−bt∗i )2, we calculate the first-order par-
tial derivative for Q(a∗, b) on both a∗ and b, and let the
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Fig. 3. Estimation of agent’s negotiation behaviour by using regres-
sion analysis.
and finally let a = exp(a∗), then the prediction func-
tion is:
U(t) = exp(a∗)× tb (12)
In Fig. 3, we illustrate an example of the regression
analysis. A power regression curve is generated to op-
timally fit all historical offers from an opponent. Also,
the confidence area of the regression curve is displayed
between ±3σ (see Section 4 for details).
3. Vector analysis
In this section, we introduce a vector analysis ap-
proach to predict an opponent’s behaviour during a ne-
gotiation. The prediction is still only based on histor-
ical offers of the current negotiation. The vector anal-
ysis approach has three major steps. Firstly, the his-
torical records of previous offers are classified accord-
ing to the difference between each pair of historical of-
fers. Secondly, offers in the same class are regressed
by adopting a linear function. Thirdly, results of differ-
ent linear regression functions are combined to gener-
ate the final prediction result. The detailed procedure
of the three steps is introduced in the following sub-
sections.
3.1. Classification
In this subsection, we introduce a vector classifica-
tion approach to classify historical offers according to
the difference between each two historical offers. Let
pairs {(ti, ûi)} (i ∈ [0, n]) be the historical records
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Fig. 4. An example of two-issue negotiation.
of an opponent’s offers in the previous n rounds in the
current negotiation, where ti (ti < ti+1) indicates the
ith negotiation round and ûi (ûi ∈ [0, 1]) indicates
the real utility that the agent gained from the opponent
during round ti. One possible case of two agent two-
issue negotiation is illustrated in Fig. 4, where the x-
axis indicates the negotiation round, and the y-axis in-
dicates the utility. The lines marked by triangles is the
negotiation on Issue 1, the lines marked by asterisks
is the negotiation on Issue 2, and the lines marked by
circles is the negotiation by considering both issues.
Each point in the graph indicates an offer. The graph
shows all offers from two agents in the first six rounds.
It can be seen that agents may have different strategies
to make concessions for different issues and/or in dif-
ferent periods of a negotiation. So according to how
fast an agent gives a concession – the slope of the line
between two points – the agent’s historical offers can
be classified.
The basic idea of the vector clustering is to classify
offers according to the slope of the line between each
pairwise in the data collection. So, the offers in the sa-
me cluster will have a similar concession rate. Firstly,
degrees of lines between one offer and all other offers
is calculated. The dominant degree will be the cluster
which this offer should belong to. By repeating this
process to all historical offers, each offer can be clas-
sified into a particular cluster. The detailed procedure
of the vector classification is listed in Algorithm 1.
An example of the vector classification is displayed
in Fig. 5. In this example, 11 points are going to be
classified into a maximum of 18 classes (10◦ for each
class). Taking point p1 as an instance, by calculat-
ing the slope of lines between the point p1 and other
Fig. 5. Classify point p1 by using vector classification.
Algorithm 1 Vector classification
Input: The set O = {(ti, ûi)|(i ∈ [0, N ])} con-
tains an opponent’s historical offers in the pervious
N rounds and the maximal number of class cNum.
Output: Non-empty classes in the form of
{cm|m = 1 . . . cNum} and each cm = {(t, û)}.
For all classes, cm
⋂




Initialization: Initialize all {cm|m = 1 . . . cNum}
to ∅.
for each point (ti, ûi) in the set O do
initialize all {tempCji |j = 0 . . . N, j = i} to 0
for each point (tj , ûj) in the set O do
if i equals j then
go to the next round
end if
degree ← arctan(uj−uitj−ti )
if degree<0 then
degree ← degree+ 180◦
end if
j ← degree×cNum180◦
tempCji ← tempCji + 1
end for
set m to the greatest value in {tempCji |j =
0 . . . N, j = i}
add point (ti, ûi) to the class cm
end for
return all non-empty in {cm|m = 1 . . . cNum}
points, it is found that the degrees of angles between
the point p1 and points p6, p7, p8, p9, p10, and p11 are
in the range [35◦, 45◦]. The degrees of angles between
the point p1 and points p2 and p3 are in the range
[135◦, 145◦]. The degrees of angles between the point
p1 and points p4 and p5 are in the range [125◦, 135◦].
Since the dominating angles between p1 and other
points are in the range [35◦, 45◦]. So point p1 is clas-
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sified as the 40◦ class. By repeating such a process, all
points are finally classified into two classes as shown
in Fig. 5, i.e. points p2, p3, p4 and p5 belong to 0◦
class, and other points belong to 40◦ class.
Because offers in the same cluster will distribute
along a straight line, then in the next section, a linear
regression approach will be employed to identify pat-
terns in each cluster with one or more linear regression
functions.
3.2. Multiple linear regression
In the previous subsection, we introduced a vector
classification approach to classify historical offers in
negotiation according to their slopes, i.e., how much
concession an agent would like to make at a certain
moment of a negotiation. After the classification, his-
torical offers in the same class have similar slopes and
we can simply adopt a linear regression approach to
analyzing each class. Now replacing U(t)∗ by U(t) =
b×t+a, û∗i by ûi, and t∗i by ti in Eq. (5), we can easily
find the parameters a and b to optimally fit all offers
in the same class by the function U(t) = b × t + a.



















































































where ti is the average of all ti, and the detailed proce-
dure to calculate the parameters a and b can be found
in Section 2.
By applying coefficients a and b, the pattern in clus-
ter ci can be represented. Even though the estimated
regression function U(t) can guarantee minimal errors
in the cluster Ci, we still do not know the value of
such a minimal error and do not have to double-check
whether this minimal error satisfies an agent’s specifi-
cation or not. So we calculate the standard deviation of
distances between historical offers and estimated of-






where |Ci| indicates the size of cluster Ci, and eti,û∗i
indicates the distance between the real offer (ti, û∗i )
to the regression line U(t), and eti,û∗i is calculated as
follows:
eti,û∗i =
a · ti − û∗i + b√
a2 + 1
(18)
If the standard deviation σe is smaller than a pre-
defined threshold, the regression function U(t) will be
considered as valid. Otherwise, the regression function
U(t) will be considered invalid, and the set Ci will be
divided into two subsets Cpi and C
q
i as follows:{
Cpi = {(ti, û∗i ) | if eti,û∗i  0}
Cqi = {(ti, û∗i ) | if eti,û∗i < 0}
(19)
Then for each subsection, a linear regression func-
tion can be generated by re-employing the process in-
troduced in this section. This procedure is repeated un-
til the distance between all historical offers and the
corresponding regression function are smaller than the
predefined threshold.
3.3. Combination of regression lines
In the previous subsection, we introduced the ap-
proach to generate multiple regression lines in each
cluster of the historical offers, so the domain area of
these regression lines may be overlapped. However,
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during the negotiation, for a certain negotiation round,
only one offer will be generated by an agent and is sent
to opponents. So we need an approach to combine re-
sults from different regression functions together.
Let {U(t)i|i = 1 . . . cn} denote all linear regression
lines, where cn is the total number of classes. Each
U(t)i represents one pattern in a cluster in the format
as follows:
U(t)i = bi × t+ ai t ∈ [timin , timax ] (20)
where timin and t
i
max defines the domain area of the
function U(t)i. Finally, the estimation of agents’ be-
haviour in the negotiation round t′ can be calculated









In the previous two sections, we proposed a power
regression approach and a vector approach to predict
an opponent’s behaviour. However, it has to be men-
tioned that both of the proposed approaches can only
provide an estimation on an opponent’s possible be-
haviour, which might not exactly accord with the op-
ponent’s real behaviours. In this paper, we make an as-
sumption that the differences (ε) between the estima-
tion behaviours and the real behaviours obey the Gaus-
sian distribution N(0, σ2). The reason for such an as-
sumption is because most estimated behaviours are lo-
cated around the real behaviours. Thus, if the deviation
σ2 can be calculated, we can make a precise decision
on the range of partner behaviours. It is known that
there is more than 99% likelihood that an opponent’s
behaviours are located in the interval [u− 3σ, u+3σ].
In this section, we introduce the proposed way to cal-
culate the deviation σ and to estimate the probability
that an opponent’s behaviour may happen in the fu-
ture.
In order to calculate the deviation σ, we firstly cal-
culate the distance between the estimation results (ui)
on an opponent’s offer and the real offer from histori-
cal records (ûi) by Eq. (22):
di = ûi − ui (22)
It is assumed that all di (i ∈ [1, n]) obey the Gaus-














Then by employing Chebyshev’s inequality, we can
calculate (i) the interval of an opponent’s behaviour
according to any accuracy requirements; and (ii) the
probability that any particular behaviour may be per-
formed by the opponent in the future. The Chebyshev
inequality is given by:




where X is an instance, μ is the mathematical expec-
tation, σ is the deviation, and ε is the accuracy require-
ment.
Equation (25) indicates the probability, that the dis-
tance from a real offer û∗i to the estimated offer ui is
shorter than the distance di, and is greater than σ
2
ε2 . So
the probability that the opponent will generate a new
offer within [μ− di, μ+ di] in the future is 1− σ2ε2 .
By employing Eqs. (12) and (25), agents can esti-
mate an opponent’s possible negotiation behaviours in
advance, and plan a suitable strategy as a response.
However, such a regression function can only illustrate
the main trend of opponents’ behaviours, it cannot give
accurate information on how opponents change their
negotiation behaviours in each negotiation round.
5. Experiments
In this section, we demonstrate experiments to test
the proposed agent behaviour estimation approaches.
We compare the proposed approaches with the Tit-For-
Tat approach [6] and illustrate the experimental results.
5.1. Experimental setup
Experiments are set up as follows. In each experi-
ment, two agents are involved, one is the buyer and
the other one is the seller. The two agents negotiate
over a single issue and both of them employ the NDF
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[8] negotiation strategy. Rubinstein’s alternating offers
protocol [24] is employed as the negotiation protocol.
The negotiation deadline is 20 rounds. Agents’ utili-
ties are normalized between 0 and 1. During the ne-
gotiation, in order to mimic an open and dynamic ne-
gotiation environment, the seller can randomly mod-
ify its negotiation strategy, and the buyer will employ
the proposed behaviour estimation approaches to pre-
dict the seller’s possible behaviour in the next round.
We repeat the experiment 1000 times. Both agents’ ini-
tial negotiation strategies are chosen randomly. In the
following subsection, we firstly illustrate the experi-
mental results in three typical scenarios, i.e. when the
seller adopts three typical negotiation strategies (con-
ceder, linear and boulware), respectively. Then we il-
lustrate an experimental result by allowing the seller
agent to modify its negotiation strategy randomly. Fi-
nally we summarize all experimental results and give
the statistical results over 1000 tests. The estimation
result is evaluated by the mean and standard deviation
(std ) over the differences between the estimated offers
and the real offers in all negotiation rounds. The mean
and the std are calculated as follows:
di = |ui − ûi|
where di is the difference between the estimated offer












where T is the total number of negotiation rounds.
5.2. Scenario 1
In the first scenario, the seller agent adopts the lin-
ear negotiation strategy. The estimation results by em-
ploying different approaches are illustrated in Fig. 6.
It can be seen that the power regression line indicates
the main trend of the seller’s behaviour very well, but
is not accurate enough to describe the details for a
certain moment. The Tit-For-Tat approach indicates
behaviour change at a certain moment, but has too
much error. The vector analysis approach can combine
the advantages of the two approaches. In Fig. 6, we
Fig. 6. Comparison of three estimation approaches when the negoti-
ation strategy is linear.
Table 1
Estimation result of power regression when the negotiation strategy
is linear
Function Domain
U(t) = 0.05× t1 [1, 20]
Table 2
Estimation result of vector analysis when the negotiation strategy is
linear
Index Function Domain
1 U(t) = 0.039× t+ 0.009 [1, 12]
2 U(t) = 0.012× t+ 0.442 [9, 14]
3 U(t) = 0.044× t+ 0.182 [10, 20]
4 U(t) = 0.032× t+ 0.314 [16, 18]
Table 3




Power Regression 0.029 0.02
Vector Analysis 0.024 0.015
draw ±3 standard deviation lines to illustrate the 95%
confidence range. Both power regression and vector
analysis results are within the 95% confidence area,
but some estimation results from Tit-For-Tat are out
of this range. In Tables 1 and 2, we list the regres-
sion functions for both proposed approaches, respec-
tively. The statistical evaluations on the three estima-
tion approaches by using Eqs. (26) and (27) are listed
in Table 3. The statistical results indicate that the vec-
tor analysis approach outperforms the other two ap-
proaches.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of three estimation approaches when the negoti-
ation strategy is boulware.
5.3. Scenario 2
In the second scenario, the seller agent employs
the boulware negotiation strategy, which gives smaller
concessions at the early stages of the negotiation and
greater concessions at the later stages. It can be seen
in Fig. 7 that the power regression function displays
the main trend of the opponent’s behaviour correctly.
However, when the real offers from the opponent ex-
hibit little fluctuation, the power regression function
cannot identify such a change. By comparison with the
power regression function, the Tit-For-Tat approach
goes to the other extreme estimation result, i.e. when
the real offers fluctuate, the Tit-For-Tat approach can
notice such a change and give immediate responses.
However, according to the experimental results, the
Tit-For-Tat approach usually made a strong attempt to
respond to changes in the real offers. For example, in
the 10th, 12th and 15th negotiation rounds, the esti-
mation results from the Tit-For-Tat approach are out-
side the ±3 standard deviation area. So such estima-
tion results can be considered as invalid. The vector
analysis approach can improve the estimation perfor-
mance based on both the power regression approach
and the Tit-For-Tat approach. According to the exper-
imental results, not only can the vector analysis ap-
proach follow the main trend of the historical offers,
but also properly indicate the fluctuations of the histor-
ical offers. Compared to the invalid estimation results
generated by the Tit-For-Tat approach, the estimation
results generated by the vector analysis approach in
these rounds fit the historical offers very well. In Ta-
bles 4 and 5, we list the regression functions for both
power regression analysis and vector analysis. Table 6
Table 4
Estimation result of power regression when the negotiation strategy
is boulware
Function Domain
U(t) = 0.003× t1.98 [1, 20]
Table 5
Estimation result of vector analysis when the negotiation strategy is
boulware
Index Function Domain
1 U(t) = 0.025× t+ 0.027 [1, 11]
2 U(t) = 0.03× t− 0.017 [3, 10]
3 U(t) = 0.023× t+ 0.133 [12, 14]
4 U(t) = 0.048× t− 0.045 [15, 20]
5 U(t) = 0.068× t− 0.422 [16, 17]
Table 6




Power Regression 0.027 0.027
Vector Analysis 0.03 0.02
displays the statistical results to evaluate the accuracy
of the three estimation approaches. It can be seen that,
again, the vector analysis outperforms the other two
approaches.
5.4. Scenario 3
In the third scenario, the seller agent employs the
conceder negotiation strategy. According to the power
regression function in Table 7, it can be seen that
the power regression analysis successfully identifies
the seller agent’s negotiation strategy. In Fig. 8, it
can be seen that the estimation results generated by
the vector analysis approach fit the historical offers
properly, except in the 16th negotiation round. The
regression functions for vector analysis are listed in
Table 8. The Tit-For-Tat approach does not perform
well in this experiment. Almost 50% of the estima-
tion results do not fit the historical offers, and five
(25%) estimation results even reside outside the ±3
standard deviation area. The statistic evaluations on
the three estimation approaches are listed in Table 9.
It can be seen that the power regression approach
achieves a similar result as the vector analysis ap-
proach, but the Tit-For-Tat approach does not perform
well.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of three estimation approaches when the negoti-
ation strategy is conceder.
Table 7
Estimation result of power regression when the negotiation strategy
is conceder
Function Domain
U(t) = 0.123× t0.7 [1, 20]
Table 8
Estimation result of vector analysis when the negotiation strategy is
conceder
Index Function Domain
1 U(t) = 0.045× t+ 0.152 [1, 5]
2 U(t) = 0.032× t+ 0.273 [6, 13]
3 U(t) = 0.032× t+ 0.32 [7, 9]
4 U(t) = 0.022× t+ 0.562 [14, 20]
Table 9




Power Regression 0.027 0.02
Vector Analysis 0.023 0.02
5.5. Scenario 4
In the fourth scenario, the seller agent is allowed
to modify its negotiation strategy randomly during the
negotiation. The experimental results are illustrated in
Fig. 9. It can be seen that the seller agent’s offer fluctu-
ates greatly and frequently. For the estimation results
generated by employing the Tit-For-Tat approach, 25%
of estimation results are located out of the ±3σ confi-
dence area. As displayed in Table 12, the average er-
Fig. 9. Comparison of three estimation approaches when the negoti-
ation strategy is dynamically modified.
Table 10
Estimation result of power regression when the negotiation strategy
is dynamically modified
Function Domain
U(t) = 0.152× t1.5 [1, 20]
Table 11
Estimation result of vector analysis when the negotiation strategy is
dynamically modified
Index Function Domain
1 U(t) = 0.002× t+ 0.01 [1, 3]
2 U(t) = 0.032× t+ 0.246 [4, 15]
3 U(t) = 0.023× t+ 0.066 [6, 9]
4 U(t) = 0.063× t+ 0.064 [7, 14]
5 U(t) = 0.038× t+ 0.14 [10, 16]
6 U(t) = 0.023× t+ 0.557 [17, 20]
ror of Tit-For-Tat in this case is almost 0.4, and the
standard deviation is around 0.57. These values indi-
cate that the estimated results generated by the Tit-For-
Tat approach are very unstable and inaccurate when
agents modify their negotiation strategy randomly. By
Comparison, the power regression approach generates
a better result. The power regression function is listed
in Table 10. According to Table 12, because the stan-
dard deviation of errors in estimated results is around
0.14, so almost all results are located inside the ±2σ
confident area. Again, the vector approach provides
best estimation results among them in this case. It can
be seen that the regression lines generated by the vec-
tor method follow the real instances much better than
the other approaches. Nearly 50% of estimated offer
are located on the real offers. As shown in Table 12,
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Table 12
Comparison of three estimation results when the negotiation
strategy is dynamically modified
Approach Mean Std
TitForTat 0.392 0.578
Power Regression 0.181 0.141
Vector Analysis 0.104 0.102
Table 13




Power Regression 0.097 0.067
Vector Analysis 0.074 0.05
both the average error and the standard deviation of the
vector approach are only around 0.1.
5.6. Summary
In order to have a comprehensive comparison be-
tween these three estimation approaches, we repeat the
experiment 1000 times. The seller agent is allowed
to adopt different negotiation strategies randomly. The
statistical evaluation results over the 1000 experiments
are displayed in Table 13. It can be seen that on aver-
age, the vector analysis approach achieves the best es-
timation performance, which has 0.074 error in aver-
age and 0.05 in the standard deviation of errors. The
result from the power regression approach is also ac-
ceptable, which is 0.097 error in average and 0.067
in the standard deviation of errors. However, the per-
formance of the Tit-For-Tat approach is not satisfied.
The average error of the Tit-For-Tat approach is al-
most eight times greater than the vector approach. In
summary, it is found that the vector analysis approach
can provide the best results in an opponent’s behaviour
prediction.
6. Related work
In this section, we introduce some related works. In
[22], we proposed a regression-based model to esti-
mate negotiation opponents’ behaviour. However, the
regression-based approach is good at indicating oppo-
nents’ main trend on negotiation strategy, but may not
sensitive enough to catch opponents’ changes on bid-
ding in each negotiation round. Therefore, we intro-
duce a vector-based estimation approach as a supple-
ment of regression-based model in this paper.
In [25], Schapire et al. proposed a machine learning
approach based on a boosting algorithm. Initially, the
estimation problem is reduced to a classification prob-
lem. All training data are arranged in ascending order
and then partitioned into groups equally. For each of
the breakpoints, a learning algorithm is employed to
estimate the probability that a new bid at least should
be greater than the breakpoint. The final result of this
learning approach is a function which gives minimal
error rate between the estimated bid and the real one.
Based on this function, agent behaviours can be esti-
mated. However, the accuracy of this approach is lim-
ited by the training data and classification approach. So
applications based on this approach can hardly achieve
a satisfactory level when negotiations happen in an
open and dynamic environment.
In [10], Gal and Pfeffer presented another ma-
chine learning approach based on a statistical method.
The proposed approach is firstly trained by agent be-
haviours according to their types. Then for an un-
known agent, it will be classified into a known kind
of agent according to their similarities. Finally, based
on these probabilities, the unknown agent behaviour is
estimated by combining all known agent behaviours.
The limitation of this approach is that, in reality, it is
impossible to train a system with all different types of
agents. Therefore if an unknown agent belongs to a
type which is excluded from the system, the estimation
result may not reach an acceptable accuracy level.
Chajewska et al. [3] proposed a decision-tree ap-
proach to learn and estimate an agent’s utility func-
tion. The authors assumed that each agent is rational
and looks for maximum expected utility in negotiation.
Firstly, a decision tree is established which contains
all possible endings for the negotiation. Each possible
ending is assigned a particular utility value and pos-
sibility. Based on the partner’s previous decisions on
the decision tree, a linear function can be generated
analogous to the partner’s utility function, and each
item in the function comes from an internal node in
the decision tree. The limitation of this approach is the
requirement that all possible negotiation endings and
the corresponding probabilities should be estimated in
advance, which is impossible in some application do-
mains when the variance of negotiation issues is dis-
crete or the negotiation environment is open and dy-
namic.
Brzostowski and Kowalczyk [2] presented a way to
estimate partners’ behaviours based only on the his-
torical offers in the current negotiation. In the first
place, partner types are estimated based on the given
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functions. For each type of agent, a distinct prediction
function is given to estimate agent behaviours. There-
fore, based on the classification of partner types and
their individual estimation functions, the proposed ap-
proach can predict partner behaviours in the next ne-
gotiation cycle. However, a partner can only perform
as a time-dependent agent or a behaviour-dependent
agent, which limits some applications. Also the accu-
racy of classification on partner types may impact the
accuracy of prediction results.
Hindriks and Tykhonov [15] proposed a generic
framework based on a Bayesian model to learn oppo-
nent negotiation behaviour in multiple issue negotia-
tion. The purpose of this framework is to learn both the
opponent’s negotiation preference and the utility func-
tion. The opponent’s preference is estimated based on
an assumption that the opponent will make a greater
concession on a less-valued issue and a smaller con-
cession on a more-valued issue. Through comparing
the opponent’s concessions for each issue, the oppo-
nent’s preference can be estimated. In order to learn
the opponent’s utility function, three basic functions
are proposed. The opponent’s utility function is fi-
nally represented as a combination of the three possi-
ble functions. By using the estimated preference and
utility function, an agent can efficiently search for an
optimal negotiation outcome. However, this approach
can only generate a satisfying result when the oppo-
nent performs a relatively simple behaviour. If the op-
ponent’s behaviour becomes complex and changeful, it
will not be estimated easily and an optimal negotiation
outcome may not be reached effectively.
Maheswaran et al. [17] proposed a Criticality-Sen-
sitive Coordination (CSC) system to handle coordina-
tion problems in complex environments. In a dynamic,
uncertain and nonlinear environment, agents may only
have partial knowledge of the team reward function,
and cannot accurately choose the optimal policy to
maximize the global reward. In order to avoid harm-
ing the current policy when an agent changes its pol-
icy, a Predictability and Criticality Metrics (PCM) is
proposed, where the predictability limits the policy
modification within an acceptable area, and critical-
ity metrics evaluate a potential policy modification by
considering the nonlinear effect. By combining these
two processes, even though it cannot guarantee that
a global maximal team reward can be reached, it can
avoid great damage on the team reward. This approach
can be applied on a coordination system where stabil-
ity is the primary consideration. However, since this
approach does not pay attention to searching for the
optimal policy, the performance of this approach may
not be conspicuous by considering the global team re-
ward.
In [9], Fatima et al. studied bilateral multi-issue ne-
gotiation between self-interested agents whose utility
functions are nonlinear. The authors argued that even
though the package deal procedure leads multiple ne-
gotiation to Pareto optimality, computing the equilib-
rium for the package deal procedure is not always
easy, especially for non-linear utility functions. In or-
der solve such a problem, the authors introduced two
approaches: (1) to approximate non-linear utility func-
tions by linear functions; and (2) to use the simul-
taneous procedure to negotiate issues in parallel but
independently. By employing these two approaches,
approximate equilibrium will be found in polynomial
time. This paper also showed that although the pack-
age deal procedure is known to generate Pareto opti-
mal outcomes, the simultaneous procedure may out-
perform in some cases by considering economic prop-
erties. However, the first approach may fail to reach an
optimal outcome when an approximate line is hard to
find, and the second approach may fail to reach an op-
timal outcome when the negotiated issues are not ab-
solutely independent.
In [26], Schvartzman and Wellman proposed a gen-
eral approach to automatically search for equilibrium
strategies in negotiation through reinforcement learn-
ing, and applied this methodology to continuous dou-
ble auction game. During the game, a new bidding
strategy will be generated by using reinforcement
learning, and tested by negotiators. If the new pro-
posed bidding strategy can improve the reinforcement
learning model, then it will be accepted as a potential
bidding strategy, otherwise, it will be discarded by the
agent. The process will complete when no further im-
provement can be made on the reinforcement learning
model. The major difference between this paper and
our work is that we pay more attention to estimate op-
ponents’ bidding behaviours and to modify agents’ ex-
isting negotiation strategy, but not focus on generating
different bidding strategies.
By comparing our approach with the above oppo-
nent behaviour estimation approaches, our proposed
approach has two attractive merits. (1) The proposed
approach does not need any training or preparation in
advance, and it can estimate an opponent’s behaviour
based only on the current historical records and gen-
erate reasonable estimation results in a timely manner.
So, an agent can save its time, and increase the negoti-
ation efficiency by employing the proposed approach;
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and (2) the proposed approach estimates an opponent’s
behaviour according to the probability that each partic-
ular behaviour will happen in the future. So an agent
can adopt the estimation results as well as the corre-
sponding probabilities to guide its own negotiation be-
haviours efficiently in the future.
7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we proposed a regression approach
and a vector approach to estimate an opponent’s ne-
gotiation behaviours. The regression approach is good
at indicating the main trend of an opponent’s negoti-
ation behaviour, and the vector approach is sensitive
to changes on an opponent’s behaviour. The proposed
approaches do not require any prior training process,
and can also indicate the likelihood of each estimated
result. The experimental results indicate the efficacy
and efficiency of the proposed approach by compari-
son with the Tit-For-Tat approach.
Future work on this research will focus on two di-
rections. (1) To extend the proposed approach from
single-issue to multi-issue negotiation, and (2) to ex-
tend the proposed approach from bilateral to multilat-
eral negotiation.
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